Bob Rides Again!
AMERICAN INFANTRY AND NATIONAL PRIORITIES
Armed Forces Journal December 2007
By Maj. Gen. Robert H. Scales (Ret.)
The progress of war, like other forms of human endeavor, is defined in terms of epochs, cycles of periodic change that sweep through and shape the course of Western civilization. Political scientists recount the advance of governance in terms of theocracy, monarchy, autarky and democracy. The history of science and culture measure the advance of Western civilization in terms of three grand epochs: the agrarian, machine and information ages. Economists speak of the evolution from barter to mercantile to market to global economies.
Military historians define the grand epochs of war in terms of formations, tactics and weapons that dominated battle at the time. Battles are the signposts that illuminate the paths through and between epochs. Rifts that separate epochs are defined by seismic rends in the fabric of war caused principally by social, geopolitical and technological change. Epochal rifts occur infrequently. There have been only four. The period between shifts continually shortens as the pace of demographic, social and technological change accelerates. A study of contemporary battles suggests that we are in the midst of another seismic event only a half century after the last.
FROM INFANTRY TO MOUNTED WARFARE
The first epoch belonged to infantry. It began in the farthest recesses of antiquity and lasted for several millennia culminating in the remarkable and deadly proficiency of the legion. For more than 500 years, Roman infantry dominated the battlefield with their discipline and ability to win in any terrain and against any enemy. The signpost that signaled the end of the age of infantry was the Battle of Adrianople in 378 AD. There, mounted Gothic horsemen demonstrated how to defeat the legion by combining shock effect and superior long-distance mobility of the horse. For the next 1,000 years, the desert cavalry of the Saracens, the steppe cavalry of Genghis Khan and the heavily armored European horsemen determined who would conquer and rule.
The battle of Pavia in 1525 fought between the mounted blue bloods of France and the common-born infantry of Spain heralded the next epochal rend in the fabric of war. The awakening of the classical era allowed the Europeans to rediscover from Roman literature the war-fighting power of infantry when placed in massed, disciplined formations. Technology in the form of the first efficient gunpowder weapons proved too powerful for even the most expensive, heavy and constrictive plate armor. For 500 years, from the Reformation to the end of European Empire, the common foot soldier from Spain, France, Germany and England proved the ultimate arbiter of success in peer warfare, European vs. European, and in asymmetric warfare, European vs. American Indian, African, Asian and Islamic.
THE ARMORED PHALANX DOMINATES AGAIN
The second age of infantry died in the trenches of the western front. The appearance of the small-bore rifle and the machine gun, as well as rifled artillery, ushered in the first precision revolution in warfare that made the battlefield too lethal for infantry to cross. The signposts of battles that preceded this third seismic rending in the fabric of war were unambiguous. The slaughter of the American Civil War and ominous indicators from South Africa and Manchuria at century’s end provided more than enough evidence that the day of unprotected infantry assault was over. But soldiers then, as now, are a conservative lot, and only the deaths of millions sufficed to make the point.
After World War I, the Germans combined the internal combustion engine and the radio to reinvent heavy mounted warfare and introduce the world to tank-on-tank blitzkrieg during the Battle for France in May 1940. This fourth rending in the fabric of warfare came at a cost, however. The race to win on the armored battlefield was predicated on the ability of armies to build larger and more complex fighting machines to best the machines of the opposition. As weapons grew larger, heavier and more complex, they became less able to fight effectively outside the narrow battlefields of the industrial world. This frenetic rush toward gigantism and overcapitalization is leading to the premature demise of the blitzkrieg epoch. And in a curious twist of historical irony, the forces accelerating this demise are former victims of the colonized world that western armies defeated so easily only a century ago.
SIGNPOSTS OF A NEW AGE
The battlefield signposts that point to the end of the blitzkrieg epoch are as numerous and unmistakable as those that appeared a century ago to signal the end of the second age of infantry. The problem is that since World War II, a period some term the “American era of war,” our military has been caught in an ambiguous epochal crease that has drawn us in conflicting directions — between blitzkrieg-age wars we fight well and post-blitzkrieg-era wars that we would prefer not to fight.
The laboratory of contemporary battle provides ample evidence to make the point: Whenever former colonial states choose to fight Western armies, Western style, they lose: Four blitzkrieg-style Arab Israeli wars (1948, 1956, 1967, 1973) ended well for the Israelis and badly for the Arabs; five American wars (Panama, 1989; Desert Storm, 1991; Kosovo, 1999; Afghanistan, 2002; the march to Baghdad, 2003) proved conclusively the dominance of American techno-centric warfare. In contrast, whenever many of these same antagonists choose to fight Western armies their way, the outcomes reverse: against us in Vietnam, Korea, Somalia, Afghanistan and Iraq; against the French in Indochina and Algeria; twice against the Israelis in Lebanon; and against the Soviets in Afghanistan.
All of these contemporary failures have characteristics that collectively add up to a fifth crease in the fabric or war. Connect the dots from the viewpoint of successful actions by our enemies during the past half century, and the argument for a return of infantry dominance goes from obvious to compelling. Their success comes from the enemy’s ability to offset our big-machine advantage with advantages of their own: masses of infantry, with enthusiasm to sacrifice that offsets skill at arms; an ability to learn quickly and adapt so that technological innovation can be offset by clever adaptations of existing technologies. The enemy has evolved a new strategy learned from past masters such as Mao and Ho Chi Minh that seeks to win by not losing. His is a global scheme in which the strategic object is merely to kill Americans until we lose the will to carry on. His geostrategy is founded on the principle of distance. Find a battlefield least conducive to long-term commitment, in inhospitable places such as cities, jungles and mountains where he can reduce the effectiveness of our machines and thereby increase the odds of defeating us with infantry alone.
A WINDOW ON THE FUTURE
Conclusive proof that another epochal shift had occurred came last year during a “Pavia moment” in the small village of Bint Jbiel, just over the Israeli-Lebanon border and nearby in the defile of Wadi Saluki, where Hezbollah fighters ambushed and destroyed a battalion’s worth of Israel’s blitzkrieg heavy tanks. The story of Bint Jbiel and Wadi Saluki not only provides a prescient window on the future, but also serves as a cautionary tale about the dangers of dismissing the signposts of epochal change. Lt. Gen. Dan Halutz, the first Air Force officer to be appointed head of the Israeli Defense Forces, said he believed that the American experience in Kosovo demonstrated that a carefully planned, orchestrated and technologically precise air campaign could collapse Hezbollah’s ability to threaten Israel.
Hezbollah had a different take. The subsequent parallel disasters of Bint Jbiel and Wadi Saluki became laboratories for teaching how a well-trained insurgent force exhaustively drilled, carefully dug in, camouflaged and armed with the latest precision anti-tank weaponry could utterly devastate a modern, technologically superior Cold War armored force, even if that force commanded the air absolutely. Just as the first precision age doomed the last age of infantry, both of these battles strongly suggest that weapons from the second precision revolution in the hands of diabolically skilled infantry will eventually make heavy, mounted warfare a relic of the machine age.
The successes of Hezbollah, al-Qaida and other new-age infantry forces tell us that we must find a way to counter this 21st-century corollary to the dilemma faced by 16th-century France. The enemy chooses to fight as infantry because he can win the infantry fight. Our own experience in Iraq and Afghanistan tells us that we have no choice but to meet him on his terms, on the ground in the close and all too often fair fight.
A UNIQUELY AMERICAN PROBLEM
But America can’t fight fair because a fair fight costs too many lives. This conundrum leads to the core of the greatest challenge of 21st-century American warfare. How will the armed forces of the U.S. prevail in this new age of infantry if the cost of infantry fighting is too high? Let’s begin by confessing how high the cost of the close fight really is. During wars in the American era, four out of five combat deaths have been suffered by infantry soldiers, principally dismounted (foot) infantry. In practical terms, this means that an overwhelming preponderance of deaths occur among a population that comprises less than 4 percent of all the uniformed population of the Defense Department. Anyone not an infantryman in contact stands a far greater chance of dying from disease or accidents than from an enemy bullet.
Of particular interest is how these close-combat soldiers die. Virtually all deaths at the hands of the enemy are suffered within a mile or less from contact with the enemy. About 52 percent die trying to find the enemy, either as scouts, on point or in ambushes. Once in contact, the close fight generally goes in our favor if the enemy can be engaged far enough away to employ superior American firepower. Put a close-combat soldier in a fighting vehicle of any sort, and his chance of surviving contact with the enemy increases about an order of magnitude. This fact flies in the face of popular perceptions drawn from battlefield footage in places such as Chechnya that show soldiers roasting in burning panzers. Most of our Cold War armor was designed to take a head-on shot from a Soviet tank. Thus, most of an American tank’s armor protection is concentrated in its front 60 percent of obliquity. Again, the irony of real combat takes over the story by confessing that all of this frontal armor has saved few lives because American armor has never faced a serious enemy tank threat. Since the beginning of the American era, only eight tank crewmen have been killed by enemy tanks — all of them in the Korean War.
In contrast to mounted combat, the statistics for infantry deaths in close combat are troubling. A comparison of kill ratios between infantry and air-to-air combat is instructive. In World War II, the kill ratio in the Pacific campaign was about 13 enemy to 1 American; in Europe against the Germans, the ratio was about 11 to1; in Korea, 13 to 1. Since the end of the Cold War, the kill ratio for the F-15 series of fighter aircraft flown by American and Israeli pilots is about 107 to 1. During the second battle of Fallujah in November 2004, the ratio between enemy and American infantry deaths was about 9 to 1 within fifty meters. For soldiers and Marines fighting inside buildings, the ratios were, tragically, much closer to parity.
Then there is the Jessica Lynch factor. The enemy in Iraq and Afghanistan realizes that he can best achieve his goal by killing those least able to protect themselves, principally logistical and support soldiers. It should come as no surprise to discover that almost four out of five casualties — killed and wounded — in Iraq have been suffered by these soldiers.
INFANTRY AS A FUNCTION
Infantry is a function, not a service or branch of service. The infantry function includes Army, Marine Corps and Special Forces troops who occasionally share the close-combat space with like-minded specialists such as tankers, military police and artillerymen. Two tasks define the function. First is intimate killing. Killing close is the essence of what it means to be an infantryman. Others on the battlefield, such as pilots and artillerymen, kill — but they kill at a distance. Killing, to them, is detached, antiseptic. After a mission, a pilot may feel remorse at the realization that the bomb he dropped at some distant target killed someone. But an infantryman sees his target die. He watches the life drain out of an enemy who chances across his sights. To be sure, soldiers other than infantrymen may occasionally stumble upon the enemy. These are incidental fighters, occasional victims of war who die in ambushes, roadside bombings and assassinations. But only an infantryman goes out every day with the intention of taking another human life in face-to-face intimate combat. It is his skill at this method of killing that wins contemporary wars.
The infantryman’s second task is to make other infantrymen. Teaching others to fight as infantry is a competency that the Army and Marine Corps have perfected over more than a century of practical experience, beginning with the creation of the Philippine Scouts before World War I and continuing with distinction to Greece and Israel immediately after World War II. The Army learned to build armies while fighting in such disparate places as Korea, Vietnam and El Salvador, and most recently in Iraq and Afghanistan.
GETTING BETTER: THE HUMAN DIMENSION
Dominance in the close tactical fight is dependent as much on human as technological factors. Dominance depends on creating world-class small units, superbly selected, trained and psychologically inoculated to endure the stress inherent in the act of intimate killing. Small-unit leaders, sergeants and lieutenants, must be found, nurtured and taught to make life-or-death decisions in the heat of the close fight. Think of a tactical, small-unit version of the Navy’s Top Gun or the Air Force’s Red Flag exercises, in which small-unit leaders and their soldiers would have the luxury harnessing training technology to get better bloodlessly.
The lesson from recent wars is that serving as a close-combat soldier is far more difficult and hazardous than serving in any other military specialty. The act of intimate killing takes a toll on even the most emotionally hardened close-combat soldier. Likewise, humping a 150-pound rucksack in 130-degree heat takes a toll on the body of even the most fit. Bureaucratic institutions and personnel polices at the Defense Department must be changed to reflect the unique requirements for making world-class infantrymen. Pay scales should be changed such that infantrymen are compensated for risk, as well as skills. They should be allowed to retire earlier in their careers before the stress of close combat scars them emotionally and physically. Small units should be staffed with greater numbers and higher ratios of leaders to followers to compensate for the inevitable attrition that comes from the tactical fight.
History teaches the same lesson over and over. Mature, intelligent, well-led, trained and motivated soldiers are far more effective in the close fight and far less likely to die. More pay, greater numbers and less combat stress should allow an all-volunteer military to select and promote those who demonstrate the tactical right stuff. Only the best and brightest among all those brought into the military should be allowed to join this elite band of brothers.
TECHNOLOGY AND THE CLOSE FIGHT
Our military has a history of waiting until soldiers start dying before applying technology to the close fight. The often-told story of body armor and Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles in Iraq needs no re-telling here. Part of the problem is that until recently, the technology to enhance the tactical fight has been developed and acquired incrementally in programs too small to compete with aircraft and ship programs. Big-ticket items tend to capture the attention of the big machine makers and the lawmakers who support them. Another problem is the lack of silver bullets such as stealth or precision strike that have proven so decisive in air-to-air combat. Real dominance in the infantry battle will demand a new approach and a new set of developmental and acquisition priorities. Instead of fixating on a few big-ticket platforms, the Defense Department must focus on developing a set of smaller complementary capabilities, the sum of which would offer the infantry true dominance in the close fight. First priority should go to those technologies that are most likely to lessen the cost of infantry combat. We know that mounted fighting diminishes the cost by an order of magnitude. The problem today is that our Cold War armored fleet carries too few infantry. Our vehicles are optimized for warfare in developed regions where weight, complexity and fuel efficiency are not impediments to tactical success. In the future, the fleet must be modernized to allow more infantry to fight mounted in distant places for extended periods, to keep them under armor longer and to allow infantry to remain protected until very close to the enemy.
If more than half of all infantry deaths occur finding the enemy, then unmanned surrogates such as low-flying aerial drones or unmanned ground robotic vehicles are needed to perform this most dangerous task. If most soldiers die within a mile of the front, a place soldiers call the “red zone,” then we must find the means to keep infantry outside the red zone long enough to destroy as many enemy infantry as possible with precise, discrete and immediately available killing power.
More than two-thirds of Marine Corps, special operations and Army infantry fight on foot. So the second greatest challenge is to develop every technological advantage to make dismounted infantry more lethal and less vulnerable. Clearly, the greatest need is for light body armor impervious to high-velocity projectiles and artillery fragments. Soldiers fighting on foot must solve the problem of touch in the close fight. A soldier’s greatest fear in the close fight is the fear of fighting and dying isolated and alone. As bullets fly, he looks constantly about for reinforcement from his buddies. Experience in all recent wars tells us that these soldiers are far more effective if they can maintain voice and visual contact with their buddies. Surely telecommunications technology has advanced far enough to enable every soldier to “see” and “talk” to everyone in his squad using an individual audio and video connection?
Finally, back to Jessica Lynch. The need to deliver ammunition, spare parts, fuel and water exposes support soldiers to the tender mercies of the enemy along the line of communications. Tomorrow’s infantry must be able to fight supported by a much smaller and much less vulnerable logistical umbilical cord. The only sure way to eliminate our logistical vulnerabilities would be to supply the close fight predominantly by air.
A MATTER OF PRIORITIES
The U.S. has practiced the infantry arts in peace and war since the American Revolution, but only recently has the art taken center stage. The enemy knows that dead soldiers are our greatest vulnerability. So winning quickly at least cost becomes more than a moral necessity. It is now a national strategic imperative. The challenge for the future is to do it better and at less cost in human life. Getting better is culturally averse because we don’t like to fight this way. We would prefer to kill from a distance, but our enemies won’t let us off the hook. They are leading us where we are reluctant to go. But contemporary history and the shrewd actions of our enemies now compel us to change our priorities. Our presence in this new age of infantry demands that making better infantry is no longer an Army or a Marine Corps problem. It’s a national problem. And the challenge is not just to get incrementally better, but also to dominate our enemies in the close fight, to achieve the same kill ratios on the ground that we have achieved recently in air-to-air combat.
Future presidents must have the latitude to send armies to distant places where the enemy has the home field advantage. Our infantry will never be able to get to these places and stay there unless it has the protection and lethality to dominate a determined and diabolical enemy in waiting. If these reforms sound as if they will break the bank, remember that if all the infantry in all the services were collected together in one place, they wouldn’t fill an NFL stadium. The next administration must realize that when entering a new epoch of warfare, all past habits are suspect. It’s time that our priorities — our national priorities — change to meet the realities of the war we will be fighting for generations.
December 12th, 2007 at 3:40 am
Why Hezbollah LOST the War in Lebanon!
And the Current ‘Present’ Situation in Southern Lebanon
By Gabriel al-Amin
Beirut, Lebanon
http://www.lebanonwire.com/0709MLN/07092429MN.asp
On July 12, 2006 Hezbollah kidnapped two Israeli soldiers that led to Israel’s war with them and, by extension, Lebanon itself. Hezbollah has been on Israel’s fence since the latter’s withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000. Israel always requested from the international community and from the Lebanese government to deploy its Lebanese Army there instead of Hezbollah militants. Hezbollah, quite naturally, refused! Hezbollah vowed to NEVER allow any other force other than itself to occupy southern Lebanon. Even during the conflict, Hezbollah said it would never agree to allow either the Lebanese army nor international monitors to patrol southern Lebanon.
Then finally, when two IDF (Israeli Defense Force) soldiers were kidnapped, Israel found the perfect excuse it was looking for to go into Lebanon and push Hezbollah well away from the Lebanese-Israel border. Israel pursued a limited invasion and killed over 500-600 Hezbollah members during the one month war. Additionally, Israel took over every single village in southern Lebanon. During the conflict even though Hezbollah received such a blow and all its members were freaked out and on the run. Yet when the hostilities ended, Hezbollah claimed victory! But did it really win?
Firstly, Israel agreed to a cessation of hostilities NOT because it surrendered and defeated militarily, but because of international pressure from the European Union and the United States. During this conflict Israel endured more international pressure, than it ever did in the past 10 years. Israel was put forth conditions and international agreements, such as the deployment of 15,000 Lebanese soldiers and 15,000 United Nations peace keepers into southern Lebanon, and arms embargo on Hezbollah. “This” proposal which was presented to Israel which EVEN Hezbollah agreed to accept, was something Israel was yearning for for many decades and was a once in a life time opportunity, it was a REAL “golden opportunity,” even the far right in Israel said “this is an excellent proposal, so give it a shot.” This cessation of hostilities, known as “The August Ceasefire”, was initiated by the United Nations and International Community, and was put forward before both parties, Israel and Hezbollah, Hezbollah JUMPED right on the wagon to accept, because they saw it as the only way out of the mess they got themselves into. While at the same time, Israel was more stubborn on accept this ceasefire-agreement, since they were on a winning streak. Ever since then Hezbollah has not been seen or heard from in Southern Lebanon! At long last the frail Lebanese Government has finally had a degree of sovereignty over all of its state and is finally monitoring and guarding its own borders.
Not too long ago, nearly all television and print media images coming out of southern Lebanon were that of armed Hezbollah fighters with their guns, outposts, and banners. Not anymore! Hezbollah is now hiding under rocks in Southern Lebanon, its military might having received a substantial blow. In addition, Hezbollah is no longer enjoying the freedom and luxury of easily transferring Syrian/Iranian weaponry across the Lebanese-Syrian border or via the Beirut seaport. Much of this due to the combined efforts of a stronger Lebanese army and U.N. forces keeping a lid on such transferals.
But even though the International Troops and the Lebanese Army keep Hezbollah in check, isn’t there still Hezbollah presence in Southern Lebanon, EVEN THOUGH they are hiding “under rocks?” The same could be said for Al Qaeda presence in the United States, who are also hiding under rocks.
Hezbollah may portray themselves as fearsome “militants” but they are in fact cowards cowering behind Lebanese civilians. Yet, through mostly pin-point targeting, the IDF dealt a heavy blow to Hezbollah. Five to six hundred Hezbollah terrorists were killed and nearly all of their bases, headquarters and tactical infrastructure destroyed.
Some might say, “But didn’t Hezbollah manage to shoot over one hundred rockets into Israel every single day? AND why, during the war, didn’t the Israel army/air-force ever manage to stop the Katyusha fire?” Well the answer to that would be “What’s so impressive about groups of one or two rag heads pointing and setting off an unguided Katyusha southward into Israel?” In addition to the fact that Hezbollah only needed 1% of their military might in order to shoot Katyushas from their scattered fields and caves, into Israel every day. Plus, the only way to have completely stopped the Katyusha fire would have been to occupy every square inch of South Lebanon, including 20 miles north of the Litani, and to stay there for a few months.
Israel ‘BADLY’ miscalculated Hezbollah, those past 6 years since it withdrew from Lebanon. Why? Because in 2004, it was estimated that if Israel was to engage in war with Hezbollah, their Katyusha arsenal would result in 100 deaths per day on the Israeli side, but instead only 2 people per day were killed by those rockets. But during the war, Israel came to the realization that 99.9% of all those rocket attacks, mostly result in a lot of noise and broken windows. Prior to the war it was also estimated that if Israel launched a ground invasion, it would result in the deaths of over 70 Israeli soldiers per day, which would have left over 2000 dead on the IDF side at the end of the 34 day conflict. But only 120 soldiers were killed in total, which makes it 3-4 soldiers per day. Also, prior to the war AND during the war, both the ‘poor’ Israeli intelligence and Hezbollah itself even claimed, that the “Mighty Hezbollah Rocket Arsenal” would hit Tel-Aviv, but ‘no rocket ever made it to Tel-Aviv!’ Instead, Hezbollah, tried to send little remote controlled ‘toy’ planes there.
The reason 120 soldiers were killed in the first place, is because what would someone expect if an army deployed 30,000 soldiers squashed together in a small, tight, open space (South Lebanon)! It was amazing that after the war, those soldier didn’t all suffer from cluster phobia. But even though Israel deployed so many soldiers in the open, Hezbollah didn’t manage to deliver that harsh blow as was estimated before the ground invasion. But after all, Hezbollah didn’t fight as courageous as the Egyptians during the Suez Canal invasion, nor as the Syrians during the war in the Golan heights.
It shouldn’t shock the world that Hezbollah bombed a couple Israeli Merkava Tanks, because even the Palestinians have done it in the past too. Blowing up a Merkava Tank is NOT an ‘uncommon’ operation. But at the same time Israel was still advancing and still taking over every village in South Lebanon, bombing every headquarter and outpost, all Hezbollah members were on the run. Even though Israel lost a couple of tanks and didn’t destroy Hezbollah, it still doesn’t mean they (Israel) were defeated militarily. The definition of military defeat, mean: to crush the other side, force it to flee and or be on the run, or force it into surrender. Israel was not defeated militarily!
The same can be said about the Israeli naval ship that was bombed by Hezbollah of the coast of Lebanon, during the first week of the conflict, which caused a tiny bit of damage to the ship and which resulted in the deaths of 4 Israeli naval soldiers. Once again this wasn’t a military defeat, but it was an internal flaw, which meant that; Israel needed a better anti missile naval detector radar, a better anti missile interceptor, and better armor for its ship. But did Hezbollah succeed in sinking the ship and destroying it completely, did they destroy all the Israeli naval ships of the Lebanon Coast, did Israel scurry away with all its ships with its tail in between its legs, or did Israel ask for a cease-fire? NO! Instead, Israel simultaneously the same day, brought the damaged ship back into Israel for repair and sent another ship to the Lebanon Coast to replace it.
During and after the war, Hezbollah regretted starting the war in the first place, by kidnapped the two Israeli soldiers. But Israel on the other hand, didn’t regret going to war with Hezbollah, not even 1%. In fact Israel was ready to go for round two, but Hezbollah, will not dare even consider thinking about it.
During the fighting, many people (both inside and outside Lebanon) finally saw Hezbollah as they really are… a terrorist group. It’s strategy had little or no military value. The rockets they launched were intended to cause terror among Israel’s citizenry. They were not aimed at Israel military targets.
Israel never managed to destroy Hezbollah. As much as the IDF might have wanted to, the wiping out of Hezbollah was not Israel’s goal. Nor could it ever be its goal. It is against the laws of physics to destroy a guerilla/terrorist group (America is learning it the hard way with Al Qaeda) since their operatives and members are always blending in and out of the civilian populations from which they so cowardly operate. In fact NEVER in history has a guerilla group ever been destroyed.
Additionally, rescuing the kidnapped IDF soldiers without a strong intelligence as to exactly where they were hidden, would have been a nearly impossible mission.. assuming they had not already been secreted out of Lebanon into Syria or Iran!
We constantly hear phrases such “Hezbollah emerged stronger,” “Hezbollah is now stronger than ever,” or “Hezbollah is now seen stronger than before!” There is some truth to that. Since before the Israeli withdrawal of 2000, Hezbollah was seen as more of a small arms, home made explosive, cut and run group, but during this conflict they were able to show off their Iranian made weapons. But they were no match for the Israeli army, whom they bowed down to at the end, by feeling too threatened to attack and provoke ever again.
When the United Nations wanted to impose a 48-hour ceasefire, it was Hezbollah which rushed to accept while Israel had to be pressured. Obviously this was because Israel had the military momentum in her favor. And when the month-long conflict ended, Hezbollah leader, Nasrallah, remained in an underground bunker, no longer enjoying frequent visits to central Beirut, giving daily “Hate Israel” speeches, driving down to his home town of southern Lebanon or enjoying first class flights to Damascus and Tehran. Nasrallah even admitted that had he known that even one percent of this war would have gone as it had, he would have NEVER kidnapped the soldiers and thus started the war!
“We did not think, even 1 percent, that the capture would lead to a war at this time and of this magnitude. You ask me, if I had known on July 11 … that the operation would lead to such a war, would I do it? I say no, absolutely not.” - Hezbollah Leader Sheik Hassan Nasrallah, August 27, 2006
In February 2007, there was a skirmish between Israeli troops and the Lebanese army on the Israel/Lebanon border, even though this skirmish that resulted in a shoot out and was unfortunate, the ray of light from all this, was that Israel was confronted and attacked by the Lebanese army and not by Hezbollah. This was one of the first signs that showed that the Lebanese army was doing its job. This was mostly due to the fact that Hezbollah lost its kingdom in Southern Lebanon, and is NOW in constant check by UNIFL, Lebanese Army, and International Troops. At least the Lebanese army was able to stand its ground and take control, unlike BEFORE the August 11 ceasefire! At least Israel finally got its wish, after 40 years, to FINALLY have the Lebanese army in control of the border. Since August 11, 2006 when the Lebanese army began its deployment in Southern Lebanon, not a single Katuysha, let alone a singe bullet was fired toward the Israeli side of the fence by Hezbollah. Unlike after the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000, when Hezbollah would look for any excuse to shoot Katyushas into Israel at least once every three months, but not anymore. No longer will the Israeli citizens of Northern Israel will ever live in fear once again!
People in the Lebanese Government now hate Hezbollah, for bringing destruction to Lebanon. All of Hezbollah’s southern Beirut strong posts were destroyed by Israel. Even after the cease fire, Israel stayed in Lebanon for two more months in order to destroy all remaining Hezbollah outposts and bunkers while Hezbollah stood by and did nothing. During the conflict some of the Israel/Lebanon border fence was destroyed and torn down, and Israel was in no rush to fix it, since what’s the point? Hezbollah will not want to mess with the IDF again! Even until today some of that fence has not been fixed yet, since the only threat of infiltration, now, is from drug dealers smuggling Hashish across that border.
But what about the Winograd Commission, “which is an independent Israeli government-appointed commission of inquiry, chaired by retired Israeli chief judge Eliyahu Winograd, which is set out to investigate and draw lessons from the failures experienced by Israel during the 2006 Israel-Lebanon conflict. Which resulted in a war panel, and even the resignation of high figures such as the Israeli chief of staff Dan Halutz.” The reason THIS is currently taking place in Israel, is it goes to show that Israel is a democratic country! If a “Lebanese-Winograd Commission” would be done to Hezbollah; for launching an illogical irresponsible attack on Israel, by kidnapping the two soldiers which led to the war and the destruction of Lebanon. And if a Lebanese Winograd Commission would be done to the Lebanese government; for not controlling its southern border by allowing thuggish armed militias (Hezbollah) to roam free there, allowing illegal weapon shipments via the Lebanese seaport, air port, and Syrian Lebanese border to those armed “non-governmental” militias, and allowing Syria and Iran to meddle in its politics, then Lebanon would crumble to dust! But after all, Lebanon is not a Democracy.
Worst case scenario, the Winograd Commission and some of the failures of this war, prove, that Israel might have been defeated from within, but not militarily.
Furthermore there hasn’t been one complaint filed against Hezbollah on behalf of UNIFL and the International Troops since last year’s August cease-fire, the only complaint filed, was against the Israeli army for their over flights over Lebanese territory. Speaking about Israeli over flights, even the Israeli army itself, hasn’t complained even once, about hostile enemy fire against its planes by Hezbollah. Since Israel withdrew from Lebanon in May 2000, up until the war last summer, they continued their daily over flight and breaches over Lebanese territory, only to find themselves being confronted by Hezbollah anti-aircraft artillery. But after the August cease-fire Israel ‘STILL’ continued its breaches over Lebanese airspace, but this time, Hezbollah hasn’t even shot one pellet at them! Maybe because they are deterred and maybe because UNIFL and the Lebanese army are now in control.
After the war, Hezbollah saw that it could no longer push around and bully Israel, and are therefore now trying to bully the “weak” Lebanese government by; their mass demonstration, camping out in front of the Lebanese Parliament, and political assassinations.
Israel did loose the war last summer, but not in Lebanon, but instead in Gaza. After Gilad Shalit was kidnapped, Israel began a massive military campaign in Gaza, destroying infrastructure, entering towns and cities, going after terrorists, and also trying to stop the Qassam rocket fire. But instead, all it achieved was nothing, and the results of it were, that now, the Palestinians saw even more of a weakness in Israel. After the Israeli military campaign in Lebanon, deterrence was at least achieved, BUT unlike in Gaza, after the massive military campaign took place there (Gaza), the Israeli deterrence was lost for good, and now, the Palestinians are, even, more UNDETERRED from Israel that ever! And therefore have increase their rocket fire into Israel. In addition to the fact that as soon as Israel stopped its military campaign, Hamas and other groups said, “They are now even more determined than ever to kidnap another Israeli Soldier.” In April of 2007, they acted on their promise, under the cover of intense rocket fire on the Israel town of Sderot, Hamas terrorists again attempted to infiltrate Israel in order to abduct another soldier, but failed. A month later the militant group Islamic Jihad successfully infiltrated Israel, to also try to kidnap an Israeli soldier, but also failed. At least they weren’t afraid to try!
After the war some Arab Governments, including the Palestinians, claimed Hezbollah achieved a divine victory! But hey, lets not forget, that some of those Arab governments and Palestinians which claimed Hezbollah won that “divine victory,” are some of those “same” Arab governments who “STILL” until today claim that Syria, Egypt, and the rest of the Arab World won the 1967 War and the 1973 War! That is why after this war Israel lost its deterrence against the Palestinians, Iran, and Syria. BUT gained heavily, its deterrence, against Hezbollah.
Conclusion:
People from around the world, before the August cease-fire, would have never believed nor imagined that the Lebanese army would EVER be in control of its southern border. Nor, people would have never believed Lebanon would EVER be able to establish control over “illegal” arms shipments across its Lebanese/Syrian border, sea ports, and airports, and, well, it finally is!
Hezbollah will most likely never dare kidnap IDF soldiers because they saw the might and strength of the Israeli army, and they now feel threatened. Sure, some Hezbollah sympathizers may throw rocks, wave Hezbollah flags or scream “Allah Akbar” at the Lebanese-Israeli border fence but Hezbollah rank and file are laying low. Very low! And Hezbollah is no longer the imminent threat at that very same border.
Since the ‘moment’ the two soldiers were kidnapped and even during the war, Israel knew, they would not succeed in getting them back, in addition to the fact that destroying a guerilla group is against the laws of physics! Once people will get those two facts into their heads, then THEY will realize that, the outcomes that were achieved as a result of this conflict, were the best possible “REALISTIC” outcomes that Israel could have achieved.
Obviously this past year, the Northern Israeli border has been the quietest it has ever been over the past 40 years.
By, Gabriel al-Amin
Beirut, Lebanon
Articles and Refernces:
UNIFL: Not ‘ONE’ complaint filed against Hezbollah since last years cease-fire
(Jerusalem Post 6/14/2007)
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1181813036239&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull
Again, Israeli gloom is misplaced (First Post - 4/17/2007)
http://www.thefirstpost.co.uk/index.php?menuID=1&subID=688&WT.srch=1
Lebanese army, UNIFIL are keeping Hezbollah in check (Haaretz - 2/21/2007)
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/828765.html
Hezbollah’s ‘Victory’? (Washington Post 9/1/2006)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/08/31/AR2006083101444_pf.html
The Lebanese Winnograd Commission (Thomas Friedman, New York Times 5/10/2007)
http://www.theolympian.com/109/story/104847.html
The Egyptian, 1973 October Victory (Egyptian State Information Service)
http://www.sis.gov.eg/VR/october/english/7.htm