Comments on: Is this how we should be teaching Strategy to our future military leaders? http://astropolitics.org/blog1/2007/12/11/is-this-how-we-should-be-teaching-strategy-to-our-future-military-leaders/ Dr Dolman's place in cyberspace Sun, 01 Aug 2010 07:22:17 +0000 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.9.2 hourly 1 By: Heiliadillnut http://astropolitics.org/blog1/2007/12/11/is-this-how-we-should-be-teaching-strategy-to-our-future-military-leaders/comment-page-1/#comment-8669 Heiliadillnut Tue, 21 Oct 2008 00:32:52 +0000 http://astropolitics.org/blog1/2007/12/11/is-this-how-we-should-be-teaching-strategy-to-our-future-military-leaders/#comment-8669 Hello, My Name is, Christopher some nice posts here look at my site: http://7gg1A1.spaces.live.com/ Hello,
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]]> By: Frank the Academic Tank http://astropolitics.org/blog1/2007/12/11/is-this-how-we-should-be-teaching-strategy-to-our-future-military-leaders/comment-page-1/#comment-789 Frank the Academic Tank Tue, 18 Dec 2007 19:46:42 +0000 http://astropolitics.org/blog1/2007/12/11/is-this-how-we-should-be-teaching-strategy-to-our-future-military-leaders/#comment-789 The article is interesting, but it has some arguably spurious assertions, assumes too much, and has some dubious sources. 1)While the Army War College is a fine PME institution, and may even be the best of all the Senior Schools, it is a bit of a stretch to refer to it as the destination of academic pilgrims from all over the world. 2) Marcella undercuts his own argument regarding the Long War and strategy by selectively citing authors that characteize the American Way of War as traditionally reliant upon "...plentiful resources, technology, kinetics, and geographic conditioning. In fact, the United States was one of the most successful practioners of and against irregular warfare throughout most of its history, without reliance on those factors. 3) Steve Fought's article and assertions may not be useful to helping the author's argument. Why are USAWC students and their counterparts impatient with theory? Is it beacuse they are filling squares? Is it because they are not really thirsting for the rationale behind their tactical competence? Or is it because after almost 2 decades in uniform and more "schooling" than their civilian counterparts have had, they are still not really prepared or interested in teh journey of the mind that will haelp prepare them to be better strategists? Application, theory, history may solve this, but what might be better is for the services and their students to stop viewing attendence at USAWC as a mark of competence and a right of passage to higher rank. The students are not given the incentive to really study and learn. They just attend. 4) Yes, AWC students of the 1930s authored the Rainbow Plans and it appears they were spot on. But maybe this is only because we did not fight a prelude to WWII like the Spanish Civil War. Strategists and graduates have not fared so well since the reopening of the War College after WWII. Nobody anticipated Korea, Vietnam, Iran, Grenada, Panama, Iraq, Kosovo, Somalia, or Afghanistan. Yet, the war we really planned for, WWWIII vs. the Soviets, was successfully deterred. 5) The case study approach may pay dividends, just as it has in B Schools. Balancing seminar with individual study may yield the best of both worlds, but not unless the students are motivated to complete the academic journey. Sadly, since most are assigned to AWC and not volunteers, this assertion is open to question. The article is interesting, but it has some arguably spurious assertions, assumes too much, and has some dubious sources.

1)While the Army War College is a fine PME institution, and may even be the best of all the Senior Schools, it is a bit of a stretch to refer to it as the destination of academic pilgrims from all over the world.

2) Marcella undercuts his own argument regarding the Long War and strategy by selectively citing authors that characteize the American Way of War as traditionally reliant upon “…plentiful resources, technology, kinetics, and geographic conditioning. In fact, the United States was one of the most successful practioners of and against irregular warfare throughout most of its history, without reliance on those factors.

3) Steve Fought’s article and assertions may not be useful to helping the author’s argument. Why are USAWC students and their counterparts impatient with theory? Is it beacuse they are filling squares? Is it because they are not really thirsting for the rationale behind their tactical competence? Or is it because after almost 2 decades in uniform and more “schooling” than their civilian counterparts have had, they are still not really prepared or interested in teh journey of the mind that will haelp prepare them to be better strategists? Application, theory, history may solve this, but what might be better is for the services and their students to stop viewing attendence at USAWC as a mark of competence and a right of passage to higher rank. The students are not given the incentive to really study and learn. They just attend.

4) Yes, AWC students of the 1930s authored the Rainbow Plans and it appears they were spot on. But maybe this is only because we did not fight a prelude to WWII like the Spanish Civil War. Strategists and graduates have not fared so well since the reopening of the War College after WWII. Nobody anticipated Korea, Vietnam, Iran, Grenada, Panama, Iraq, Kosovo, Somalia, or Afghanistan. Yet, the war we really planned for, WWWIII vs. the Soviets, was successfully deterred.

5) The case study approach may pay dividends, just as it has in B Schools. Balancing seminar with individual study may yield the best of both worlds, but not unless the students are motivated to complete the academic journey. Sadly, since most are assigned to AWC and not volunteers, this assertion is open to question.

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